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Abstract—With the ubiquity of IoT devices there is a growing 
demand for confidentiality and integrity of data. Solutions based 
on reconfigurable logic (CPLD or FPGA) have certain 
advantages over ASIC and MCU/SoC alternatives. 
Programmable logic devices are ideal for both confidentiality and 
upgradability purposes. In this context the hardware security 
aspects of CPLD/FPGA devices are paramount. This paper 
shows preliminary evaluation of hardware security in Intel® 
MAX 10 devices. These FPGAs are one of the most suitable 
candidates for applications demanding extensive features and 
high level of security. Their strong and week security aspects are 
revealed and some recommendations are suggested to counter 
possible security vulnerabilities in real designs. This is a 
feasibility study paper. Its purpose is to highlight the most 
vulnerable areas to attacks aimed at data extraction and reverse 
engineering. That way further investigations could be performed 
on specific areas of concern. 
Keywords—CPLD and FPGA; Hardware Security; evaluation 
against attacks; reverse engineering; non-/semi-/invasive attacks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Modern systems with wireless connectivity and Internet 
access require robust hardware security to prevent all sorts of 
attacks [1,2,3]. In order to comply with these demands modern 
semiconductor chips are designed with hardware security in 
mind. 
Recent scandal with modified server motherboards 
manufactured by Supermicro [4,5] forced developers to 
improve the security through the monitoring of system booting 
process. Solutions based on trusted components are the best 
choice. However, reprogrammable components such as SoCs, 
CPLDs or FPGAs offer more flexibility and better control with 
the ability to later upgrades in the field. In modern 
motherboards BIOS is usually located in SPI Flash susceptible 
to modification attacks [6,7]. Given the high speed of SPI bus 
only solutions based on CPLD or FPGA will be operating in 
real time. Moreover, the hardware security of such devices is 
usually higher given the fact that any reverse engineering will 
involve significantly more efforts. This is because unlike CPU 
that executes code sequentially, CPLD and FPGA perform 
operations in parallel based on logic implementation and state 
machines. These days the border between CPLD and FPGA is 
blended. Some latest CPLDs contain special functional blocks 
and more logic elements than small FPGAs. However, all 
CPLDs can operate immediately after power-up, while most 
FPGAs require external bitstream to be uploaded, usually via 
slow serial interface. Certain FPGA families have on-chip or 
in-package Flash to hold the configuration image. Some 
FPGAs offer bitstream encryption to prevent cloning and 
reverse engineering, but some security vulnerabilities were still 
found in them [8,9,10]. Most CPLD and FPGA devices are 
configured using JTAG interface [11]. However, security flaws 
were still found in specific JTAG designs that allowed 
readback of the on-chip configuration bitstream [12]. 
TABLE I.  CPLD AND FPGA FAMILIES WITH ON-CHIP CONFIGURATION 
 Devices 
Features 
Logic 
Elements 
User 
Flash 
kbit 
NVM 
Ima-
ges 
Min 
Size 
mm2 
Min 
Cost 
USD 
Secu-
rity 
CPU 
core 
Microsemi 
ProAsic3 
130nm 
330 – 11k 
LUT3 
1 1 6×6 3 
Lock 
Verify 
AES 
ARM 
M1   
soft 
Microsemi 
Smart 
Fusion2 
65nm 
6k – 146k 
LUT4 
1024 – 
4096 
1 11×11 8 
Lock 
Verify 
CRC 
AES 
ARM 
M3  
hard 
Microsemi 
PolarFire 
28nm 
100k – 
500k 
LUT4 
297 – 
513 
1 11×11 110 
Lock 
Verify 
CRC 
AES 
ARM 
M4 
hard 
Lattice 
XP2 90nm 
5k – 40k 
LUT4 
0 1 8×8 3 Lock 
none 
Lattice 
MachXO2 
65nm 
256 – 
6864 
LUT4 
0 – 256 1 
2.5× 
2.5 
2 Verify 
Mico8 
soft 
Lattice 
MachXO3 
65nm 
640 – 
9400 
LUT4 
64 – 
448 
1 
2.5× 
2.5 
3 
Lock 
Verify 
Mico32 
soft 
Lattice 
MachXO3D 
65nm 
4300 – 
9400 
LUT4 
367 – 
2693 
2 10×10 20 
Lock 
Verify 
Mico32 
soft 
Intel 
MAX 10 
55nm 
2k – 50k 
LUT4 
96 – 
5888 
2 3×3 2.50 
Lock 
Verify 
CRC 
AES 
 
NIOSII 
soft 
 
Table 1 outlines the modern reprogrammable live-on-
power-up FPGA families. Only latest devices fabricated with 
65nm or smaller process offer decent amount of user Flash 
memory. Intel MAX 10 devices offer storage for two 
configuration images thus making the update process much 
safer against any interruptions. A golden image can always be 
stored on-chip, that way any failures during the update process 
can be handled efficiently without the need of establishing a 
secure reprogramming environment. Also, if bugs are found in 
the new firmware it can be quickly rolled back using the 
recovery function implemented in the golden image. 
Active monitoring devices used for security applications 
such as server motherboards will likely have to meet certain 
requirements, for example, NIST Root-of-Trust standard [13]. 
Given the extensive features of Intel MAX 10 FPGAs (dual 
boot from on-chip flash, user flash, security lock) they seem to 
be the most likely candidates for this purpose [14,15]. They 
offer good balance between the number of elements, user Flash 
memory size, package size, and cost. However, for the end 
users the security is paramount. Therefore, this paper is 
focused on hardware security evaluation of some MAX 10 
devices. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives 
introduction to hardware security, attack technologies and 
differences between CPLD/FPGA and MCU/SoC solutions. 
Section 3 describes experimental setups for evaluation against 
various attacks. Section 4 shows the results, and Section 5 
discusses them. Section 6 outlines future work, and Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Hardware Security helps with designing a secure system by 
combining the knowledge of existing attack technologies with 
state-of-the-art defence technologies. Without awareness about 
modern attack methods it would be impossible to design a 
secure system. Countermeasures comes in help to assist the 
design process. However, for economical and convenience 
reasons it is not always possible to incorporate all 
countermeasures. Hence, the job of the well educated hardware 
designer is to choose the right solutions. 
A. Hardware Security and attack technologies 
The attacks on semiconductor devices can be split into 
several categories. Non-invasive attacks which are usually low-
cost and involve observations of the device operation or 
manipulations with external signals. They require only 
moderately sophisticated equipment and knowledge to 
implement. They do not physically harm the chip and often 
leave no traces. Invasive attacks, in contrast, are expensive and 
require sophisticated equipment and knowledgeable attackers. 
However, they offer almost unlimited capabilities to extract 
information from chips and understand their functionality. 
These attacks always leave traces and often destroy the chip. 
Semi-invasive attacks fill the gap between non-invasive and 
invasive attacks and usually affordable to many attackers. For 
these attacks the chip needs to be depackaged but the internal 
structure remains intact. Although these attacks often leave 
traces, in most cases the chip remains fully operational.  
Tools used for carrying out non-invasive attacks are usually 
available at most electronics engineering labs. These tools 
involve digital multimeter, IC soldering/desoldering station, 
universal programmer, oscilloscope, logic analyser, signal 
generator, power supply, PC and prototyping boards. 
Non-invasive attacks can be divided into side-channel 
attacks (timing [16], power analysis [17], emission analysis 
[18]), data remanence [19], data mirroring [20], fault injection 
(glitching [21], bumping [22]) and brute forcing [23]. 
Tools used for carrying out invasive attacks involve simple 
chemical lab, high-resolution optical microscope, wire bonding 
machine, laser cutting system, microprobing station, 
oscilloscope, logic analyser, signal generator, power supply, 
scanning electron microscope (SEM) and focus ion beam (FIB) 
workstation. 
Invasive attacks can be divided into sample preparation 
[24], imaging [25], direct memory extraction [26], reverse 
engineering [27], microprobing [28], fault injection [29] and 
chip modification [30]. 
Tools used for carrying out semi-invasive attacks involve 
simple chemical lab, high-resolution optical microscope, UV 
light source, lasers, oscilloscope, logic analyser, signal 
generator, PC and prototyping boards. 
Semi-invasive attacks can be divided into imaging [31], 
laser scanning [32], optical fault injection [33], optical 
emission analysis [34] and combined attacks [35]. 
B. Advantages of CPLD/FPGA over MCU/SoC solutions 
Complex Programmable Logic Device (CPLD) consist 
from limited number of building blocks – macrocells. Each has 
a programmable logic expression and a flip-flop with 
configurable inputs and outputs. These devices are usually 
relatively small (32 to 512 macrocells), slow (about 100MHz), 
have limited number of I/O pins (about a hundred), but 
inexpensive and live on power-up. Their configuration memory 
is usually based on EEPROM with proprietary programming 
interface and some security features against readback. 
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) consist from large 
number of logic blocks: LUT, Flip-Flops, SRAM, DSP, I/O 
interfaces. It has a hierarchy of reconfigurable interconnects. 
These devices are usually large (thousands of logic elements), 
fast (hundreds of MHz speed), large number of I/O pins 
(hundreds to thousands), but expensive and require time to 
upload the bitstream into configuration SRAM. 
These days the gap between CPLD and FPGA is shrinking. 
Some latest CPLDs contain special functional blocks and more 
logic elements than some small FPGAs. However, both CPLDs 
and FPGAs share the same advantage over CPU-based 
microcontrollers (MCU) and system-on-chip (SoC) devices – 
they have programmable logic and perform operations in 
parallel. 
C. Reverse engineering challenges 
The reverse engineering is a way to understand how a 
particular device works. From an attacker point of view reverse 
engineering allows ultimate insight into the device 
functionality and understanding how its security protection 
operates. With scrupulous analysis of the security features 
some vulnerabilities and weaknesses could be found. This 
could potentially lead to powerful and inexpensive attack, 
especially with non-invasive methods. Those methods could be 
easily replicated and transferred to other attackers. In some 
cases mass produced low-cost attacking tools could be built 
[36,37]. 
Reverse engineering of a design implemented in CPLD or 
FPGAs is significantly harder than a one implemented in 
microcontroller or SoC. This is because no such tools as 
disassembler exist for logic devices. Therefore, even if the 
bitstream is successfully extracted it would take time to convert 
it into a netlist or schematic for further analysis. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
For experiments the following Intel MAX 10 devices were 
used: dual supply 10M08DCF256, 10M16DAF256, and single 
supply 10M04SCE144, 10M08SAE144, 10M08SCE144, 
10M16SCE144. 
A. Non-invasive attacks 
For the initial non-invasive experiments the Intel MAX 10 
Evaluation Kits with 10M08SAE144 and 10M16SCE144 
devices were used. Some TQFP144 devices were programmed 
in the Elnec BeeProg2 universal programmer using PLD-18 
adapter. For most experiments the devices were placed into a 
ZIF socket attached to custom built test board (Figure 1). Then 
a JTAG cable was connected to either the Altera USB Byte 
Blaster, modified Elnec PLD-18 adapter (Figure 2) or the 
custom built control board (Figure 3). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Test board with BGA256 ZIF socket. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Elnec BeeProg2 with modified PLD-18 adapter. 
The test board had 2.2Ω resistors in VCC, VCCA and VIO 
power supply lines for power analysis experiments using a 
1GHz digital storage oscilloscope with differential probes. The 
control board had an 80MIPS PIC24 microcontroller with 
implementation of JTAG protocol and was connected to a PC 
running custom software. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Custom built control board. 
The test board with MAX 10 device was powered by 
system power supplies with programmable voltages. For power 
glitching experiments an arbitrary waveform signal generator 
was used to provide glitch timing. The board had a dedicated 
switch for connecting pre-selected power supply to the core 
supply circuit of FPGAs. 
For electromagnetic analysis (EMA) an H-probe was used 
with a 50dB amplifier connected to an oscilloscope. The probe 
was positioned over different areas on the chip surface using a 
motorised stage. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Custom built board for electromagnetic fault injection. 
For electromagnetic (EM) fault injection a special pulse 
generation board was built (Figure 4). It was supplying a high 
voltage pulse of up to 500V to a small custom-built coil. The 
duration of the pulse from 10ns to 100ns was determined by a 
signal generator with 1ns precision timing. The actual fault was 
produced by a flyback voltage pulse generated by the coil 
when it was disconnected by a transistor on the board. It is 
almost impossible to get rid of this flyback voltage pulse 
generated by the coil, but it was possible to use it as the main 
source for fault injection. 
For eavesdropping on the JTAG protocol used in MAX 10 
a 500MHz logic analyser was used. 
Data acquisition and processing were carried out on a PC 
using Matlab software. 
B. Semi-invasive attacks 
For semi-invasive experiments the TQFP144 devices were 
first opened from the backside before being placed into the test 
board under optical microscope with IR laser input (Figure 5). 
The power of the laser was controlled from 1mW to 100mW. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Test board mounted under microscope. 
C. Invasive attacks 
For invasive sample preparation 10M16SAU169 device 
was first mechanically polished from the balls side down to 
silicon thickness of 10 microns. Then the remaining silicon 
was removed with chemical etching. 
IV. RESULTS 
The process of creating a design and configuration files was 
first assessed. For that the Quartus Prime development 
software was installed and example files from the Intel MAX 
10 Evaluation Kit were used. The output of successfully 
compiled design is in *.sof file. It can be used to directly 
configure SRAM, but in order to program the configuration 
Flash it must be converted into *.pof file. During this process 
several security fuses can be activated, these are Verify Protect, 
Encrypted POF Only and JTAG Security fuses. For encrypted 
configuration also *.ekp file containing AES key must be 
created. 
Quartus Programmer tool can use *.pof files to program 
MAX 10 devices. It can also convert them to *.jam STAPL 
files [38]. Software of Elnec Universal programmer can 
convert *.pof files into *.hex files. This simplifies their 
analysis. However, the same *.hex file can be extracted from a 
variable in *.jam file. 
Small changes in the design (flip 1 bit  of data) result in 1-
bit change in the main body of *.sof file. However, *.sof file 
has a 16-byte number at address 008Bh which is unique for 
each design, design checksum at address 0114h and CRC at the 
end – all proprietary except checksum. In the *.pof file there is 
1-bit difference in the design area and multiple differences in 
system area, as well as proprietary CRC at the end. The *.jam 
file incorporates data from *.pof file plus system configuration. 
All configuration files have proprietary format. Although 
the JTAG communication can be eavesdropped using logic 
analyser, it does not help in understanding the bitstream 
format. Also, any single-bit change in the data stream results in 
the non-operational device because of multiple CRC checks. 
For 10M08SCE144 device the mapping file created by 
Quartus software contains the following information: 
ICB      0x00000000  0x000007FF 
UFM    0x00000800  0x0001CFFF 
CFM0  0x0001D000  0x0004E7FF (0x0004628F) 
EPOF: OFF 
Secured JTAG: OFF 
Verify protect: OFF 
Watchdog value: Not activated 
POR: Instant ON 
IO Pullup: ON 
SPI IO Pullup: ON 
Data checksum for this conversion is 0x0266384E 
All the addresses in this file are byte addresses 
 
Quartus tool generates different *.pof files depending on 
the settings of fuses, in both system (ICB) and data (CFM0) 
areas. For Verify Protect fuse: 
0030h: 0F,A5,48,6C       01D007h: D2       01D00Ch: F3,0C,59 
For Encrypted Bitstream with AES key: 
0000h: 16-byte scrambled key 01234...EF ==> 3B7F195D2A6E084C 
0028h: 0F,A5,48,6C       01D007h: C2       01D00Ch: E2,0C,98 
For Encrypted POF Only fuse: 
0014h: 0F,A5,48,6C       01D007h: C3       01D00Ch: F2,0C,58 
For Secured JTAG fuse: 
001Ch: 0F,A5,48,6C      01D007h: C6       01D00Ch: A7,0C,58 
STAPL file analysis is complicated by some obfuscation. 
Variables have obscured names (A12, V185). Subroutines have 
meaningless names (L107, L1259). However, IRSCAN, 
DRSCAN and WAIT commands can be found. What also 
helps is adding PRINT command for subroutine name, JTAG 
command, size and data. Then all the communication 
information from dialog screen can be copied into a file for 
further analysis. 
Quartus Programmer works differently from Universal 
programmer. In Quartus software even if Verify Protect fuse is 
set the verification is allowed, but Examine (readback) fails 
above 1D000h for 10M08SCE144 chip. Encrypted POF Only 
fuse prevents Program, Verify and Blank Check. In Universal 
programmer Verify Protect fuse prevents verification and 
reading above 1D000h. But Encrypted POF Only has no effect 
on security. This is caused by the preload of SRAM in Quartus 
tool and the use of JTAG user mode. However, this exposes 
undocumented security flaw in MAX 10 devices. If only 
Verify Protect fuse is set it does not protect the configuration 
memory. Neither Encrypted POF Only fuse on its own protects 
anything. It is only the combination of both Verify Protect and 
Encrypted POF Only fuses that protects the design. 
When the bitstream is encrypted it is not straightforward to 
decrypt it even if the key is known. The mode of AES 
operation is not documented. Moreover, the sequence of input 
bytes and initialisation vector are also unknown. It is very 
likely that some reverse engineering of Quartus tools might be 
required to extract this information. 
A. Non-invasive attacks 
Power analysis reveals some information about internal 
device operation. Figure 6 shows the boot process from 
internal Flash. If the bitstream is encrypted with different keys 
there is a noticeable difference in the power trace (Figure 7). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Boot process from internal Flash. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Difference in power trace between correct and incorrect keys. 
When the encrypted bitstream is corrupted this results in 
termination of the boot process. However, the differences 
between the last AES decryption operation is clearly visible 
(Figure 8). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Difference in power traces for corrupted bitstream. 
There was no success with EMA experiments. First, the 
signal-to-noise ratio was significantly smaller compared to the 
power analysis even when the H-probe coil was placed above 
the most contributing area. Second, the contribution of the 
internal clock signal to the trace was an order of magnitude 
larger than to the power analysis trace. 
TABLE II.  POWER GLITCHING RESULTS FOR SINGLE SUPPLY MAX 10 
 Device 
Glitch parameters 
1.5V 
5µs 
1.45V 
4µs 
1.4V 
4µs 
1.3V 
3.5µs 
10M16SCE144 9 1706 1860 17 
 
TABLE III.  POWER GLITCHING RESULTS FOR DUAL SUPPLY MAX 10 
 Device 
Glitch parameters 
0.6V 
1.2µs 
0.4V 
0.7µs 
0.3V 
0.5µs 
0.2V 
0.4µs 
10M16DAF256 241 650 13491 9954 
 
Some MAX 10 devices were tested for sensitivity to power 
glitching. For that a signal generator was used to supply the 
VCC of the device with unstable power. This was carried out 
during the Examine operation (reading the Flash contents) in 
the Quartus Programmer. It was observed that some power 
glitches passed through the internal detection circuit without 
triggering the device restart with boot process. This resulted in 
some data corruption. The results for single supply MAX 10 
device is presented in Table 2. The glitch parameter 
corresponds to the reduction of the core supply voltage from 
the nominal value of 3.0V. Table 3 presents the results for dual 
supply MAX 10 device. The glitch parameter corresponds to 
the reduction of the core supply voltage from the nominal 
value of 1.2V. The value in the table corresponds to the 
number of incorrect reads from the whole Flash memory of the 
device during JTAG read operation. It can be observed that 
dual supply devices are more sensitive to power glitching due 
to the direct connection of the core supply grid with the pins. 
The lower the peak voltage of the glitch the higher is the error 
rate. However, if the peak voltage is too low it triggers the reset 
of the device. 
The example of a successful power glitch is presented in 
Figure 9. It was causing the wrong data to be fetched from the 
on-chip Flash memory thus potentially allowing an attacker to 
circumvent the security protection fuses. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Example of a successful power glitch. 
The results of testing MAX 10 devices against 
electromagnetic fault injection are presented in Table 4 for 
single supply device and in Table 5 for dual supply device. 
Both devices showed good sensitivity to the glitching during 
readout of the Flash memory. As with the power glitching if 
the peak voltage of the pulse was too high it caused the device 
to malfunction. The example of a typical voltage on the coil 
(bottom trace) and the disturbance created in the power grid 
(middle trace) are presented in Figure 10. 
TABLE IV.  EM GLITCHING RESULTS FOR SINGLE SUPPLY MAX 10 
 Device 
Glitch parameters 
190V 
27ns 
220V 
30ns 
260V 
35ns 
290V 
40ns 
10M16SCE144 26 80 184 352 
 
TABLE V.  EM GLITCHING RESULTS FOR DUAL SUPPLY MAX 10 
 Device 
Glitch parameters 
170V 
31ns 
200V 
34ns 
240V 
30ns 
285V 
30ns 
10M16DAF256 241 650 191 254 
 
The JTAG command space was analysed for any 
undocumented commands. All known commands were sourced 
from Configuration User Guide, Boundary Scan Guide, BSDL 
files and *.jam files. The JTAG interface was scanned for the 
length of DR registers. Also, power analysis was used to spot 
any activities caused by undocumented commands. The 
following undocumented commands were found: 008, 015, 
090, 091, 1EE, 206, 207, 2B0, 2D0, 303, 3F5. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Example of a successful electromagnetic glitch. 
Another security vulnerability found was related to write 
protection of certain Flash memory regions (UFM and CFM). 
It was possible to change any bit in Flash memory except the 
system area from 1 to 0. This could be used to extract 
encrypted bitstream, because single bit change results in 
noticeable changes in the power trace. 
Once the JTAG protocol was learned and implemented on 
the test board it was possible to scan the whole Flash memory. 
It was found that it has 4 regions in 10M08SCE144 device: 
System area: 00000 – 007FF not readable, writable once after erase 
User Flash memory: 00800 – 1CFFF always readable and writable 
Configuration memory: 1D000 – 4E7FF read protectable, always writable 
Shadow memory: 4E800 – 4EFFF always readable, write protected 
 
Data remanence testing was also applied to the device. This 
was achieved by earlier termination of the chip erase operation. 
This revealed susceptibility of MAX 10 devices to these 
attacks. More than 97% of configuration data were successfully 
extracted with Verify Protect fuse enabled. It might be possible 
to optimise the process to achieve better success rate. 
B. Semi-invasive attacks 
Full chip laser fault injection scanning of 10M08SCE144 
device with Verify Protect fuse set was performed. The whole 
die was scanned with the size of 43004400 microns. The 
result is presented in Figure 11. The light blue area corresponds 
to fault in JTAG operation, dark blue area to corrupted UFM 
data and red area to disabled Verify Protect fuse. 
The area where unlocking of Verify Protect fuse takes place 
corresponds to the Flash array. In order to find the precise 
locations for fault injection the scanning area was reduced to 
10001000 microns. The fault injection timing was optimised 
according to the information gathered from the power trace. 
That is the time when the power consumption is increased due 
to access to the Flash. The result is presented in Figure 12. The 
red area corresponds to the disabled Verify Protect fuse. 
  
Fig. 11. Full chip laser fault injection scanning. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Flash area laser fault injection scanning in Verify Protect mode. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Flash area laser fault injection scanning in JTAG Secure mode. 
The same Flash array area was scanned on 10M04SCE144 
device with JTAG Security fuse activated. In this secure mode 
the chip does not respond to any JTAG commands except 
boundary scan related. This is the most secure mode available 
in MAX 10 devices. The result is presented in Figure 13. The 
blue area corresponds to the disabled JTAG Security fuse. 
In order to be more successful with power glitching attacks 
the timing restrictions of the data fetch from Flash memory 
needs to be better understood. Laser fault injection attacks can 
help a lot with that. To achieve this the laser was focused at 
one of the sensitive locations that caused both unlocking the 
JTAG Secure fuse and corruption of the Flash data. Figure 14 
shows the results of overshooting beyond TCK rising edge. 
The X coordinate corresponds to the laser switched time 
beyond TCK in microseconds and Y coordinate to the time 
before TCK. Figure 15 shows the undershooting results with X 
coordinate corresponding to the time between switching off the 
laser and TCK change in 1/10 of microseconds and Y 
coordinate to the laser pulse time in microseconds. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Fault timing results for overshooting TCK pulse. 
 
 
Fig. 15. Fault timing results for undershooting TCK pulse. 
It can be observed that the laser pulse timing has no effect 
after TCK change. Also, the laser pulse time must be quite 
large compared to the data rate – at least 15 microseconds 
versus 800ns data time. This could be caused by the fact that 
the data from a whole row in Flash array are first loaded into a 
buffer before being transferred via data bus. 
C. Invasive attacks 
For invasive sample preparation of 10M16SAU169 device 
only backside approach was used. The silicon substrate was 
mechanically thinned to 10 micrometers before the remaining 
silicon was chemically etched exposing the internal layers. 
Figure 16 shows the JTAG logic area under optical 
microscope. The transistors density is quite high and typical to 
that of 55nm process used in chip fabrication. The number of 
gates is approximately 60’000 which will make reverse 
engineering process quite challenging. Also all the imaging 
will have to be done using SEM. 
 
 
Fig. 16. JTAG area under optical microscope with 160× objective. 
 
 
Fig. 17. FPGA logic area under optical microscope with 160× objective. 
Figure 17 shows the FPGA logic area under optical 
microscope. Although the overall area is very large, there are 
many identical blocks. In order to understand the bitstream 
encoding the whole area of FPGA fabric will have to be 
reverse engineered. This will be time consuming and expensive 
process. Figure 18 shows the Flash array area under optical 
microscope. The Flash memory cells have surprisingly large 
size of 280660nm and therefore are visible under optical 
microscope. 10M16SAU169 chip has two Flash arrays on the 
die. Each array is 64 bit wide with 32 columns per bit and 
14542 rows of data. 
 
 
Fig. 18. Flash area under optical microscope with 160× objective. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
This paper outlines only some initial feasibility study 
research carried out on Intel MAX 10 FPGAs. Some areas will 
have to be investigated more thoroughly to confirm possible 
attacks as proof of concept. 
There is a lot of security via obscurity in MAX 10 FPGAs. 
The lack of information about JTAG interface makes any 
analysis and attacks very challenging. Although many 
undocumented commands were found, making any use of them 
would require further research. Especially if someone wants to 
find any deliberately inserted backdoors. 
With the unknown bitstream encoding format it would be 
very challenging to reverse engineer any design even if the 
bitstream is not protected. Very likely that development tools 
will have to be reverse engineered to understand the bitstream 
structure and encoding format. 
Power analysis helps a lot in understanding the internal 
functionality of MAX 10 devices. It should be possible to 
extract the AES key and encrypted bitstream using DPA 
methods. 
There are three security related fuses in MAX 10 devices: 
Verify Protect, Encrypted POF Only, and JTAG Security. 
Verify Protect and Encrypted POF Only fuses do not provide 
any security on their own. It is only the combination of both 
fuses that protects the bitstream, however, the user Flash 
memory (UFM) is not protected and can always be read and 
programmed. Moreover, even when the configuration Flash 
memory (CFM) is protected it can still be programmed, thus 
making modification attacks possible. Also, data remanence 
can be used to recover Flash data after full chip erase 
operation. It is only the JTAG Security fuse that can 
completely disable the access to Flash via JTAG. However, 
semi-invasive attacks were very successful in bypassing this 
protection. All these attacks are relatively easy to implement 
thanks to insecure implementation of the security fuses. In 
particular, the specific value 0x6C48A50F in the system area 
of the Flash which activates the security fuse. 
Power glitching and EM fault injection attacks are likely to 
be the most dangerous if reliable and controllable way of their 
implementation is found. Using these attacks it might be 
possible to bypass the security protection without removing the 
chip from original board. This is especially important for 
devices in BGA packages, because they are harder to mount for 
semi-invasive attacks. 
Invasive attacks can be used to recover information from 
Flash and to reverse engineer the JTAG circuitry. That way it 
would be possible to understand all undocumented JTAG 
commands and check for any backdoors and Trojans. 
VI. FUTURE WORK 
Further analysis of MAX10 devices needs to be carried out 
to evaluate its security. This would involve power glitching 
and EM fault injection experiments with more precise timing 
control. Also, undocumented commands should be looked at 
with further brute force searches. Bitstream encryption and 
encoding will be another area for further investigations. 
Finally, attempts to reverse engineer the JTAG logic should be 
considered in a hope to find some backdoors or hardware 
Trojans. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The main purpose of this paper was to evaluate the 
hardware security of Intel MAX 10 low-end FPGA devices 
against widely known attacks. Although not specifically 
designed for high-security applications these devices are 
positioned as being highly secure. This is reflected in their 
datasheets with the description of various security features. 
This paper demonstrates that many of those security features 
are not robust enough. 
The research described in this paper has found some serious 
security issues in the Intel MAX 10 devices. In many aspects 
the security of these devices is implemented via obscurity. The 
lack of documentation on the JTAG commands and AES mode 
of operation makes certain attacks more challenging. This is 
only a feasibility study paper that is aimed at outlining some 
weaknesses in the hardware security of MAX 10 devices. 
Some attacks, in particular non-invasive, will require further 
development work to become fully successful. However, the 
initial observations and preliminary results were very 
encouraging. 
The security fuse settings are not properly documented. 
Verify Protect fuse only protects the configuration Flash 
memory (CFM) but leaves user Flash memory (UFM) fully 
accessible. Moreover, the access to the Flash memory is still 
possible via FPGA design using SRAM configuration. 
Encrypted POF Only fuse on its own does not protect JTAG 
access to the Flash memory. It is only the combination of both 
Verify Protect and Encrypted POF Only fuses that gives 
protection of configuration memory against reading. However, 
the user Flash memory is still readable. Moreover, the write 
access to both user Flash and configuration Flash is still 
possible. This can be used for modification attacks, for 
example, to extract the encrypted bitstream. 
Scanning of the JTAG interface command space revealed 
many undocumented commands. However, very likely that 
silicon reverse engineering is the only reliable method for 
understanding functionality of those commands. 
MAX 10 devices leak a lot of information via power 
consumption. Power analysis helps in mounting fault injection 
attacks by allowing more precise synchronisation. AES 
decryption always leaves distinctive power traces clearly 
distinguishable for different keys and different data. In 
combination with Flash modification attacks this can be used 
for encrypted bitstream extraction. 
Further work is required to find reliable implementation of 
non-invasive power glitching and EM fault injection attacks. 
Not only they are much faster to implement (minutes vs hours 
for semi-invasive) but they do not require the device to be 
taken off the original board. This is especially convenient for 
devices in BGA packages. 
Semi-invasive attacks in the form of laser fault injection 
were found to be capable of bypassing all security protection 
fuses in MAX 10 devices. Multiple attack points were found 
within the embedded Flash array. Also these attacks were 
found not to be very sensitive to the timing of the laser pulse. 
The sample preparation time for devices in TQFP packages 
was relatively short of just a few minutes. However, BGA 
packages are likely to require precise milling to prevent 
damaging of the power supply grid located under silicon die 
inside BGA carrier PCB. 
For successful reverse engineering of bitstream some 
reverse engineering of Quartus tools will be required. 
Finally, the reverse engineering of JTAG logic might lead 
to finding a backdoor or Trojan that would allow easy access to 
Flash memory including system area with AES key. 
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